Put your money where your butt is : a commitment contract for smoking cessation by Gine, Xavier et al.
Policy Research Working Paper 4985
Put Your Money Where Your Butt Is






Finance and Private Sector Team
July 2009
WPS4985Produced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 4985
The authors designed and tested a voluntary commitment 
product to help smokers quit smoking. The product 
(CARES) offered smokers a savings account in which 
they deposit funds for six months, after which they take 
a urine test for nicotine and cotinine. If they pass, their 
money is returned; otherwise, their money is forfeited 
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to charity. Eleven percent of smokers offered CARES 
tookup, and smokers randomly offered CARES were 3 
percentage points more likely to pass the 6-month test 
than the control group. More importantly, this effect 
persisted in surprise tests at 12 months, indicating that 
CARES produced lasting smoking cessation. 
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I. Introduction 
More than five decades after Strotz (1955)  modeled dynamic inconsistency, debate 
continues over how to represent preferences for consumption over time.
1 Introspection, 
casual empiricism, and laboratory evidence have motivated theorists to develop several 
type of models in which consumers exhibit more impatience for near-term trade-offs than 
for future trade-offs.
2 The consumption of addictive substances has been a particular 
focus of such models.
3  These models share the prediction that some (self-aware, or 
“sophisticated”) consumers will seek to voluntarily constrain their future consumption 
choices: they will demand commitment devices.
4
We take some initial steps toward addressing the empirical viability and effectiveness 
of commitment devices for smoking cessation, using evidence from a field experiment in 
the Philippines. Some smokers were randomly assigned an opportunity to voluntarily sign 
a commitment contract (branded Committed Action to Reduce and End Smoking, or 
“CARES”) to stop smoking. A smoker signing the contract pledged his own money that 
he would pass a cotinine (the primary metabolite of nicotine) urine test six months later.
 Yet there is little field evidence on the 
demand for or effectiveness of such commitment devices. 
5
Eleven percent of smokers offered the CARES contract signed up. This is comparable 
to  takeup  rates for a leading “self-help” treatment: nicotine replacement medications 
 
If the CARES client passed the urine test he got his money back (no interest accrued on 
the account). If he failed the test the local bank offering the savings product donated the 
money to charity. This is essentially the performance bond contract suggested in Gruber 
and Koszegi (2001). A second treatment group received “cue cards,” visually aversive 
wallet-sized pictures that are modeled on Canada’s mandated cigarette packaging and 
intended to regularly remind smokers of the health risks from smoking. 
                                                 
1 See Phelps and Pollack (1968) for another early, formal model with time-inconsistent preferences. 
2 See, e.g., Laibson (1997) , O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999; 2001), Gul and Pesendorfer (2001; 2004), and 
Fudenberg and Levine (2006). 
3  Models of addiction with self-control or temptation problems include Gruber and Koszegi (2001), 
Laibson (2001), O’Donoghue and Rabin (2002), Bernheim and Rangel (2004), and Gul and Pesendorfer 
(2007). 
4  In contrast, standard neoclassical models of intertemporal choice do not predict a demand for 
commitment.  Becker and Murphy (1988) model the consumption of addictive substances along the lines, 
and Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1991) test the model’s key empirical predictions. 
5 The testing protocol has limitations, detailed below, but has been used by public health campaigns and 
tests of other treatments (Benowitz et al. 2002), including Volpp et al (2006; 2009) and some of the 
randomized trials of nicotine replacement medications summarized in Stead et al (2008). 3 
 
(patch, gum, inhaler, or nasal spray).
6 The average client made a deposit every two weeks 
and ended up committing 550 pesos ($11 USD) by the end of the six-month contract 
period. 550 pesos is about 20% of monthly income
7
The 12-month results are more interesting for several reasons. The 6-month test date 
was scheduled up to 4 weeks in advance, and the test could be passed by abstaining from 
smoking for as little as a few days before the test date.
 and roughly equal to the average out-
of-pocket expense for about 6 months’ worth of cigarettes incurred by CARES clients at 
baseline. 
Our  results  suggest that CARES helps smokers quit. Smokers randomly offered 
CARES were an estimated 3.3 to 5.8 percentage points more likely to pass the 6-month 
urine test than the control group, and 3.5 to 5.7 percentage points more likely to pass the 
12-month urine test than the control group. Using the random assignment of whether 
CARES was offered to estimate treatment effects-- specifically, intention-to-treat effects-
- generates results that are free of bias (e.g., from an omitted variable such as the strength 
of desire to stop smoking). We then estimate the effects of CARES usage-- treatment-on-
the-treated effects-- by using the randomly assigned offer to instrument for usage. These 
estimates indicate increases of 31 to 53 percentage points in the likelihood of 12-month 
test passage. The voluntary takeup decision means that one must be careful in thinking 
through whether these treatment-on-the-treated estimates will generalize to the full 
population of smokers. We discuss this issue in the Conclusion after detailing the design 
and results of the present study. 
8
                                                 
6 Seventeen percent of smokers U.S. smokers reported using nicotine replacement medication during the 
last 12 months in a nationally representative 2001 phone survey (Bansal et al. 2004). In the only study  we 
know of from the Philippines, only six percent of a sample of relatively heavy smokers who had already 
decided to quit had ever used any form of nicotine replacement therapy in past smoking cessation attempts 
(Tipones and Fernandez 2006).  
7 Income is very roughly estimated from marketer observations of subject appearance and work activity. 
8 Possibilities of gaming the 6-month test aside, the public health literature finds that even short-term 
abstention or failed quit attempts increase the probability of quitting eventually. 
 The 12-month tests, in contrast, 
were “surprise” tests with only a day or two gap between test solicitation and 
administration.  The 12-month results also  lacked any  incentives  for fraud, since all 
commitment contract money had been returned or forfeited at 6 months, and hence there 
was no financial consequence tied to the 12-month test result.  Lastly, practical reasons 
required that subject compensation for taking the 6-month test vary across treatment arms 4 
 
(CARES users did not receive compensation, while all other subjects did). In principle 
this could generate sample selection bias. The 12-month test does not suffer from this 
problem, since all subjects were offered equal compensation for taking the test. 
The finding that a limited-time (6-month) commitment produces longer-term smoking 
cessation suggests that commitments can facilitate the formation of good habits. This in 
turn suggests that commitment contracts may be worth subsidizing  if viable private 
markets fail to develop in some settings (due, e.g., to legal obstacles or externalities). In 
some cases commitment contracts could serve as a lower-cost substitute for, or low-cost 
complement to, conditional cash transfers  for healthy behaviors (Volpp et al. 2008a; 
Volpp et al. 2008b; Charness and Gneezy forthcoming). 
The  effect of CARES on smoking quits, although small in nominal number of 
individuals who stopped smoking, is large in relative terms. The sample mean pass rate 
for the surprise 12-month test was only 10.1% or 18% in the control group, depending on 
the assumption used to classify subjects who did not take the test. These low levels of 
transition from smoking to non-smoking status are typical, given the addictive nature of 
smoking.
9
The magnitude of the CARES treatment effects is also large relative to other smoking 
cessation treatments. Within-sample we find little evidence that the aversive cue cards 
affect smoking quits, and the upper bound of the cue card 12-month treatment-on-the-
treated confidence interval implies an increased likelihood of surprise test passage that is 
1/8 of the comparable point estimate on CARES. The results also suggest that CARES 
has effects that are comparable  to other treatments that have been tested using 
randomized trials on other samples. Volpp et al (2006) find that modest financial bonuses 
offered through a U.S. Veterans Affairs hospital increase short-term cessation but not 
lasting quits. Volpp et al (2009) find that larger financial bonuses ($250 for 6-month test 
passage, $400 for 12-month test passage), offered through a workplace program, increase 
both short-term cessation and lasting quits (with a treatment-on-the-treated effect of 5.8 
  Our intention-to-treat effects represent an 34.6% (3.5./10.1)  or  32.0% 
(5.7/17.8) increase over these baseline likelihoods of smoking cessation.  
                                                 
9 See, e.g., the American Cancer Society’s Guide to Quitting Smoking, which states: “Why is quitting and 
staying quit hard for so many people? The answer is nicotine.” Mark Twain offers a related perspective: 
“Quitting smoking is easy. I’ve done it a thousand times.” Song et al (2002) report that 46% of U.S. 
smokers made a serious attempt to stop in the 1993-94, but only 5.7% successfully abstained for a period of 
one month or more. 5 
 
percentage points).  Non-financial interventions, such as over-the-counter  nicotine 
replacement medications, have been tested in dozens of randomized trials and generally 
produce treatment-on-the-treated effects that are smaller than those found here for 
CARES (Stead et al. 2008).  
Despite CARES’ large treatment effects, a surprisingly large proportion of smokers 
who voluntarily committed with CARES, 66%, ended up failing to quit. This is consistent 
with various behavioral biases in preferences and/or expectations (partial naiveté about 
dynamic inconsistency, projection bias, over-confidence). Or it may be the case that these 
smokers are sophisticated about their self-control problems and use CARES to commit to 
an earnest quit attempt  that  improves the likelihood of eventual cessation (e.g., 
DiClemente et al. 1991; Hymowtiz et al. 1997). Also, the fact that clients who ended up 
failing made smaller commitments--  fewer  and smaller deposits after opening the 
account, but before taking the test-- suggests that any welfare loss is blunted by the 
choice of lower commitment intensity. Anecdotally, several clients reported having spent 
less on cigarettes, but then failing to stop completely. Thus the lost deposits may have 
been  (partially)  offset from a welfare perspective by a reduction in smoking.  Note 
however that we lack data on cigarette purchases to assess the empirical magnitude of 
this substitution. The implications of such biases or dynamics for optimal contract design 
is an important topic for future research.  
The results in this study are unusually direct evidence on the takeup and effectiveness 
of a commitment device for managing the consumption of an addictive substance. The 
only comparable studies we know are Paxton’s (1979; 1980; 1982). These studies have 
three key differences from ours. First, they were administered in a highly structured and 
clinical setting to smokers who were already participating in a smoking cessation 
program.  Our study includes smokers of varying smoking  intensities and ex-ante 
dispositions toward cessation aids. Second, Paxton’s control groups received a rich set of 
other smoking cessation aids, including counseling, social pressure, and aversion therapy. 
Our study takes a more over-the-counter approach and compares the effects of CARES to 6 
 
a control group that receives nothing other than basic information.  Third, Paxton’s 
analysis does not exploit random assignment.
10
Our study also relates to prior work on commitment devices for other decisions that 
may involve self-control problems.
  
11
Our paper proceeds as follows: the next section describes the voluntary commitment 
savings product that we designed for smokers who want to quit smoking. Sections III 
describes the cue cards treatment. Section IV details  the experimental design  and 
implementation by Green Bank in the Philippines. Section V reports the results of the 
study.  Section VI concludes, with particular attention to heterogeneity and its 
 Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) find that 37 of 51 
MBA students elect to impose binding deadlines on themselves for completing  class 
assignments. Deadlines improve task performance but students do not necessarily set 
them optimally.  
Two papers on savings-- Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) and Thaler and Benartzi 
(2004)— find that products with commitment features increase savings rates. But the 
decisions and treatments in those papers make it more difficult to interpret the treatment 
effects as tests of time inconsistent preferences. In Ashraf et al, individuals were offered 
an illiquid savings account (SEED) that did not allow withdrawals until a goal was 
reached. SEED might provide benefits other than self-control: spousal control, opt-out of 
informal risk sharing arrangements, and mental accounting. SEED also is not a direct 
commitment to lower particular consumption (as CARES is), but rather simply a 
commitment to not withdraw funds deposited into the SEED account. Thaler  and 
Benartzi’s Save More Tomorrow™ (SMART) plays more on status quo bias, money 
illusion and loss aversion, and is also not a binding commitment: clients can complete a 
single  form to change their contribution to retirement savings, thus undoing the 
commitment. 
CARES, in contrast, offers the opportunity to make a more binding and direct 
commitment on a specific, tempting consumption behavior. Thus CARES provides a 
more direct test of time inconsistency with respect to consumption than the earlier 
literature on savings. 
                                                 
10 Paxton randomized subjects into different arms but then estimates treatment effects by comparing those 
who tookup the commitment product to the control group. 
11 T DellaVigna (forthcoming) reviews field evidence on commitment devices. 7 
 
implications for generalizing these results to the full population of smokers (and to other 
similar behaviors). 
 
II. CARES Product Design 
Committed Action to Reduce and End Smoking (“CARES”) is a voluntary commitment 
savings program specifically designed for smokers who want to quit smoking. The basic 
design of the product allows a smoker to risk a self-selected amount of his own money 
that will be forfeited unless he  passes a biochemically verified test of smoking cessation, 
administered as a urine test  of nicotine and cotinine byproducts,  at  six months after 
signing the commitment contract. The  particular product design and study described 
below was implemented by the Green Bank of Caraga, on the island of Mindanao in the 
Philippines. 
Green Bank marketed CARES by sending bank representatives into the street to 
target obvious smokers. Details on the marketing are described with the experimental 
design below (in Section IV). 
Green Bank required a minimum balance of 50 pesos (~= $1USD), collected by the 
field marketers, to open a CARES account. Marketers encouraged smokers to deposit the 
money they would normally expect to spend on cigarettes into a savings account every 
week for six months.  The savings  account did not yield any interest—  this is an 
important feature for the bank to prevent non-smokers from opening the account merely 
because of the convenience of deposit collection services. The bank offered most 
randomly-selected individuals weekly deposit collection; the remaining CARES clients 
had to go to a branch to make deposits beyond the opening one.
12
                                                 
12 Clients lose the weekly deposit collection service if they miss three consecutive deposits. 
 
Clients could only make deposits, and not withdrawals, from the CARES account 
during the six month commitment period. Hence all deposited funds were at risk. Clients 
who passed the six-month urine test got their entire balance back. Clients who failed (or 
did not take) the test forfeited their entire balance.  8 
 
Trained  Green Bank technicians  test  CARES  clients’ smoking status  using  the 
NicCheck
TM urine strip test for nicotine and its primary metabolite, cotinine.
13 NicCheck 
has been used in previous anti-smoking programs, including the Dutch Cancer Society’s 
“Quit and Win” campaign, and the financial bonus incentive testing in Volpp et al (2006; 
2009). The test result provides a categorical measure of recent nicotine consumption, 
with values ranging from zero (no exposure) to fifteen (high exposure).
14
The cue cards are pocket-sized, graphic depictions of the negative health consequences of 
smoking. Each individual received one of four pictures: a premature baby (with text 
"Smoking harms unborn babies"), bad teeth (with text "Smoking causes mouth and throat 
cancer"), black lung (with text "Smoking causes lung cancer"), or a child hooked up to a 
respirator (with text "Don't let children breathe your smoke"). By law, such images must 
be featured on cigarette packages in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Hoek and 
 Green Bank 
counts only a zero result as passing, and both marketers emphasized that clients must stop 
smoking completely in order to be sure of passing the test. 
Green Bank contacts each client three to four weeks prior to his six-month deadline to 
set up a urine testing appointment. If a client can not be reached initially the Bank makes 
repeated attempts to set up a test date within one week of the maturity date. If a client is 
deemed unable to take the test within the stipulated one-week grace period due to 
mitigating circumstances (e.g., working in another location), he is allowed an additional 
three weeks to take the test. If the client was reached and refused to schedule a date, the 
account balance was forfeited one week after the six-month commitment date.  
 
III. Cue Cards Treatment Design 
                                                 
13 Initially CARES clients were required to take a blood test at a nearby hospital lab. But delays and added 
costs led Green Bank to switch to urine strips that could be used in the field. NicCheck product 
specifications indicate that the urine strips sacrifice a bit of test specificity (the ability to detect a true 
negative result, which is 97% for urine strip versus 99% for lab-based cotinine analysis), but offer 
equivalent test sensitivity (the ability to detect a true positive result, which is roughly 97% for both urine 
strips and lab-based cotinine analysis) and the ability to provide results in the field, within 15 minutes. 
Green Bank found similar specificity (one false positive out of 18 self-reported non-smokers) and much 
lower sensitivity in its own pilot testing, where marketers randomly approached people on the street in our 
study area, asked if they were smokers, and then offered 30 pesos to take the urine strip test. 
14 Small and portable test strips are dipped into the urine sample, stimulating a chemical reaction that 
changes the test strip’s color.  The color result ranges from white (no nicotine exposure), to light pink 
(moderate nicotine exposure), to red (high nicotine exposure).  The test administrator then compares the 
test strip’s color to a NicCheck color scale and assigns the test result a number ranging from 0  (no 
exposure) to 15 (high exposure). 9 
 
Gendall 2005). Smokers assigned to the Cues treatment were offered their choice of the 
above cards, and encouraged by the marketers to keep them handy and/or post them in 
locations where the subject tended to smoke. More than 99% of subjects offered the cue 
cards accepted them.  
 
IV. Experimental Design 
Our study sample consists of 2,000 smokers aged 18 or older who reside on the island of 
Mindanao  in southern Philippines. Green Bank marketers identified smokers by 
approaching  people and asking them whether they smoke regularly. If they did, the 
marketer then asked if they wanted to participate in a short survey on smoking.  All 
subjects received an informational pamphlet on the dangers of smoking, and a tip sheet 
on how to quit. Since the primary objectives of this study were to determine whether first 
there was demand for CARES, and second whether CARES increased smoking cessation, 
the marketers only collected very quick and basic baseline data on age and smoking 
status (see Section V-A for more details). 
The  experiment  was implemented in three distinct waves of marketing  (the 
econometric specifications will condition for these waves). The first two  waves  took 
place in Butuan City from August to December 2006. After completing the baseline 
survey marketers revealed a sticker on the back of the survey that randomly assigned the 
subject to one of four groups: (1A) CARES with deposit collection, (1B) CARES without 
deposit collection, (2) Cues, or (3) Control.
15
                                                 
15 In the first wave there were 20 situations in which marketers interviewed respondents with either one or 
two others present; in these cases, marketers were instructed to interview all individuals in the group before 
disclosing the random assignment.  All respondents in the group received the same assignment as the first 
interviewee.  Impact results discussed below correct standard errors for any clustering within groups of 
individuals that received joint marketing. 
 The probability of assignment to groups 
was initially 45%, 45%, 5%, and 5%. After establishing that there was sufficient takeup 
of CARES, Green Bank changed the assignment probabilities to 15%, 15%, 30%, and 
40% for the second wave. 418 smokers were surveyed (and hence drawn into the sample 
frame) in the first two waves. Of the 266 assigned a CARES offer, 34 took the product. 
Two individuals from the Cues group also opened an account (after hearing about the 
product and approaching bank staff). In our analysis we code these individuals in the 
Cues group, in adherence to the random assignment. 10 
 
The third marketing wave ran from February to May 2007, in the neighboring town of 
Ampayon. Here Green Bank implemented new randomization procedures designed to 
produce  even better compliance  with the randomized treatment assignment.  Now 
marketers used a calculator to solve an equation based on the subject’s birth date (the 
residual of dd + mm + yy, divided by three). The individual was then assigned to CARES 
group if the residual was zero, to Cues if the residual was one, and to Control if the 
residual was two. Given the low takeup in the CARES group without deposit collection 
in the first two waves (4.3%), and the fact that the geographic area for the third wave was 
more rural, all respondents in the Ampayon  CARES  group  were offered deposit 
collection service.
16
Given the random assignment, we expect individuals who end up in treatment and 
control groups to have statistically indistinguishable baseline characteristics on average, 
after we control for the likelihood of assignment to each arm. Table 1b presents related 
evidence. The F-statistic from a regression of assignment to CARES on all baseline 
covariates is 0.41 (p-value of 0.969), and for assignment to Cues is 0.54 (p-value of 
0.900). When we examine individual variables across the CARES and Control groups, 12 
out of 13 are similar statistically, and only one variable fails at the 10% level: 95.4% in 
the CARES  group  reported experiencing specific situations that make them want to 
smoke, whereas only 92.8% of control individuals reported the same. The Cues treatment 
individuals are similar statistically to the control in 10 out of 13, with the significant 
differences found on “wanting to stop smoking sometime in your life,” “wanting to stop 
smoking in 1 year” and “will actually quit smoking in 6 months.” These variables may 
  49 of the  515  Ampayon  subjects  offered CARES opened the 
account. Table 1a, Panel A summarizes CARES offers and takeup rates. 
In order to validate the quality and accuracy of information  provided  by the 
marketers, field staff from Innovations for Poverty Action conducted spot-checking visits 
with randomly selected respondents who had been offered CARES. More than 90% of 
the clients accurately described the main features of the product design. 
                                                 
16 As detailed in our equation (1) below, controls for randomization conditions and marketing wave ensure 
that this low takeup rate does not confound inference on treatment effects. We also confirm that dropping 
the no-deposit collection CARES treatment arm does not change the results (compare Table 4 to Appendix 
Table 1). 11 
 
also be correlated with smoking cessation, so we estimate treatment effects with the full 
set of baseline covariates as control variables.   
Six  months  and 12 months after the initial marketing, the bank attempted to 
administer the urine test to all study subjects (testing procedures are detailed in Section 
II). CARES clients had to take the six-month test or automatically forfeit their deposit 
balance. Non-clients (including those assigned to the cues and control groups) were paid 
30 pesos (60 cents US) for taking the six-month test, and everyone in the sample frame 
was paid 30 pesos for taking the 12-month test. 
Table 1a Panel B shows that the bank reached 63% of those in the baseline for the 
six-month urine test, with no difference in contact rate across the three treatment and 
control groups). Of those contacted 95% agreed to take the test. Since we find lower 
agreement in the CARES group (93% vs. 97% in the control) we report six-month 
treatment effects under alternative assumptions about the smoking status of those who 
refused to take the test. 
Table 1a Panel C shows that the bank reached 60% of those in the baseline for the 12-
month urine test, with no difference in contact rate across the three treatment and control 




A. CARES Takeup 
In total, 83 out of 781 (11%) individuals offered CARES signed a contract. Table 1b 
Columns 7-9 shows univariate analysis of the takeup decision from data on the limited set 
of characteristics marketers collected in the quick baseline survey administered prior to 
treatment assignment and marketing.
17
                                                 
17 Only a handful of the 2,000 subjects were existing Green Bank clients. Marketers did not elicit income 
directly, but their observation of subject appearance and work activity indicated that average subject 
income was substantially lower than that of typical Green Bank clients.  
  The following baseline characteristics were 
positively correlated with taking up CARES: wanting to quit (at some point in life, or 
now), optimism about quitting (as indicated by responding yes to “will you quit smoking 
in the next year?”), and pre-existing strategic behavior in managing one’s cravings (as 
indicated by responding yes to “do you try to avoid areas or situations that make you 12 
 
want to smoke?”). Negative correlates with CARES takeup were: wanting to quit 
smoking more than a year in the future (perhaps an indicator of procrastination) and 
smelling like cigarettes (likely  an indicator of heavy smoking).  Table  2  shows 
multivariate estimation of takeup correlates.
18
However, the pattern of deposits is intuitive.  Figures 1 and 2 show that those who 
succeed start off making higher deposits, and continue to make deposits throughout the 
entire life of the project. The trend is downward, in that deposits get smaller and less 
frequent towards the end. Once enough funds are in the account to be binding and modify 
one's behavior, further deposits are unnecessary to change behavior. On the other hand, 
 The main results here are that the full set 
of baseline characteristics are jointly significant but explain  only about 10% of the 
variation in the takeup decision.   
 
B CARES Usage 
Table 3 shows some summary statistics on CARES deposits. 
Opening balances were 57 pesos on average: this is four times the monetary value of 
the number of cigarettes the client reported smoking per week. Ninety percent of clients 
opened with the minimum amount of  50 pesos. Eighty percent of clients then made 
additional contributions.  On average CARES clients made a deposit every two weeks, 
and by six months the average balance grew to 553 pesos. Given self-reported smoking 
intensity and a per-cigarette cost of one  peso, the average CARES client committed 
roughly six months worth of cigarette spending to the account. 
Not surprisingly CARES clients who used the account more intensively were more 
likely to pass the urine tests. We show results for the 6-month test in Table 3 and the 12-
month test in Appendix Table 2. Successful clients made more deposits, were more likely 
to retain deposit collection services by making regular deposits, and had larger balances 
at contract maturity. These differences were more pronounced for 6-month test passage 
than for 12-month passage. Of course, since contract terms and deposit requirements 
were not randomized, we can not infer a causal relationship between deposit amount, 
deposit regularity and success. 
                                                 
18 All takeup and impact regressions include indicator variables for the three marketing waves.   13 
 
those who fail drop much more precipitously than those who succeed, and converge to 
only one out of ten individuals making any deposits at the halfway point of the study.   
 
C. Treatment Effects on Smoking Cessation 
We estimate intent-to-treat (ITT) effects of CARES and cue cards on test passage using 
the OLS specification: 
(1): passi
t = α + βcaresi + χcuesi + δXi + γWi + εi 
Where i indexes individuals, t refers to the 6-month or 12-month test, pass, cares and 
cues are all binary variables, X is the vector of baseline covariates, and W is a vector of 
dummies for the three marketing waves. We report these results in Table 4, Panel A. We 
also estimate (1) using probit instead of OLS (Appendix Table 3), and after dropping the 
baseline covariates (Appendix Table 4), and find very similar results. 
Each table reports results on 6-month test passage in odd columns, and on 12-month 
test passage in even columns. We estimate effects under three different assumptions on 
clients for whom we do not have a test result: i) these clients would have failed the test 
(Columns 1 and 2), ii) these clients have the average pass rate; i.e., we drop these clients 
(Columns 3 and 4), iii) these clients have the average pass rate, unless they were found by 
the technician and refused to take the test, in which case we assume they would have 
failed (Columns 5 and 6).
19
We do not find any significant effects  from  the cue cards.  Although the point 
estimates on cue cards are not statistically different than those for CARES, it is important 
to keep in mind that the takeup rate for cues was nearly 100%. So the maximum feasible 
ITT effect for cues is 1.0, while for CARES it is only 0.11/1. In other words, even if one 
  
Table  4  Panel A shows CARES ITT effects on 6-month test passage of 3 to 6 
percentage points under these assumptions. These effects are large relative the control 
group sample mean passage rates of 0.08 to 0.12. The effects on 12-month test passage, 
which as discussed above are probably a better measure of effects on a lasting quit spell, 
range from 4 to 6 percentage points. Again these effects are large relative to the control 
group sample mean passage rates of 0.10 to 0.18. 
                                                 
19 Six test strips turned blue (off the NicCheck results spectrum) in each of the six- and twelve-month 
follow-up pools. This is the likely due to the TB medicine Isoniazid.  We coded these blue strips as failures, 
but Green Bank returned the commitment balance to the one CARES client with a blue result.  14 
 
takes the cue card point estimates literally (as different from zero), they imply treatment-
on-the-treated effects that are more than an order of magnitude smaller than those for 
CARES. Table 4 Panel B confirms this. 
Table  4  Panel B shows treatment-on-the-treated  (ToT)  results, using random 
assignment to CARES as an instrument for takeup. The ToT estimates imply 30 to 65 
percentage point increases in test passage. This suggests that CARES usage increases by 
several fold the probability of test passage and a lasting quit spell.
20
                                                 
20 The cue card treatment-on-the-treated estimates are insignificant and nearly identical to the intent-to-treat 
because of nearly 100% takeup of the cue cards. 
 
  
Appendix Table 5 reports the same specifications for the sub-sample of smokers that 
reported wanting to quit smoking at some point in their life in the baseline survey 
(Appendix Table 6 reports summary statistics for this sub-sample). The CARES point 
estimates suggest somewhat larger treatment effects for this sample. We also find some 
significant increases in 6-month test passage from the cue cards, but no significant effects 
at 12 months.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
We designed a commitment product to help people quit smoking and tested it in 
cooperation with Green Bank using a randomized controlled trial in the Philippines. 
The results suggest that Committed Action to Reduce and End Smoking (“CARES”) 
helps smokers quit. At the end of the commitment contract period (6-months), subjects 
offered CARES contract were 3.3 to 5.8 percentage points more likely to pass a urine test 
for short-term smoking cessation  than the control group, and after 12-months (the 
preferred specification), the effects were 3.5 to 5.7 percentage points.  From simple 
analysis of counts of successes and failures, 29 of the 83 who took-up passed at 6 months 
and 54 failed. Of the 29 who passed the 6 month test, 14 then passed (and 15 failed) the 
12-month test as well, whereas of the 54 who failed at 6 months, only 7 then passed at 12 
months and 47 failed. Treatment-on-the-treated estimates suggest that those who signed a 
CARES commitment increased their probability of test passage and a lasting quit spell by 
several fold. 15 
 
These results suggest that the CARES product is an effective treatment for smoking 
cessation. We do not know of any comparable trials on other treatments in the 
Philippines, but the  CARES  treatment effects  compare favorably to those  found for 
nicotine replacement therapy in randomized controlled trials in other settings (Stead et al. 
2008).  The CARES takeup  rate (11%) also compares well to  nicotine  replacement 
therapy (Bansal et al. 2004; Tipones and Fernandez 2006), which is notable given the 
novelty of the CARES product. Presumably commitment  contract takeup rates could 
increase if familiarity, trust, and information about the product builds. If so commitment 
contracts could help public health efforts to address the “under-use” of smoking cessation 
treatments (Cokkinides et al. 2005; Orleans 2007). 
Rough calculations suggest that CARES passes a social cost-benefit test. We estimate 
that CARES’ cost per quit is around $700 in PPP-adjusted terms.
21
Nevertheless the majority of CARES clients in our study failed to quit, suggesting 
that there is still much to be done in improving the effectiveness of smoking cessation 
treatments. In particular it remains to be seen whether and how our results will generalize 
to other populations,  or  to  behaviors  relevant for models of  time-inconsistency (e.g., 
weight loss, exercise, task management, or consumption more generally). Both empirics 
and theory provide some guidance in how to think about external validity. The 11% take-
up rate for CARES implies that our average  treatment effects mask important 
heterogeneity  in treatments effects across different consumer “types”. Clearly our 
 This is much less than 
standard estimates of the (social) benefits of smoking cessation. E.,g., the U.S. Center for 
Disease Control (2002) reports that employers benefit $3400 per quit-year from increased 
productivity and reduced health care costs.  Many  studies  also  find large benefits  to 
former smokers from health improvements and increases in quality-adjusted years of life. 
And of course the commitment contract provider may earn  benefits  as well. In the 
implementation studied here Green Bank earned a spread on deposits, and public 
relations benefits. In other implementations contract providers might cover costs from 
forfeited balances, fees, and/or from advertising. 
                                                 
21 We first estimate per client cost by inflating Green Bank’s per account costs for acquisition (marketing) 
and administration (deposit collection, urine testing) by the ratio of per capita, purchasing-power-parity-
adjusted GDP for U.S. vs. the Philippines. Then we get the per quit cost by inflating per client cost by the 
inverse of our lowest estimate for the 12-month treatment-on-the-treated effect (i.e., we inflate by 1/0.31). 16 
 
average positive treatment effect is not driven by time-consistent individuals, who should 
have no demand for commitment devices. Nor do our results apply directly to time-
inconsistent individuals who plan to quit but are “naïve” about their self-control problems 
and hence incorrectly believe that they will quit without a change in incentives. Rather, it 
seems likely that our results are driven by a subset of smokers, with time-inconsistent 
preferences, who are (partly) sophisticated about their self-control problems. The 
evidence that CARES takeup may be higher among smokers who said that they tried to 
avoid situations that make them want to smoke (Table 1a; Table 2) is consistent with 
(partial) sophisticates driving takeup, since avoiding situations can be viewed as a form 
of (nonbinding) commitment device. Identifying more about heterogeneity in preferences 
and sophistication is a critical direction for future research. 
A closely related line of inquiry for future research is testing whether commitment 
contracts complement or substitute for other smoking cessation treatments. Bundling 
commitment devices with other treatments that impart awareness or sophistication (e.g., 
information on how difficult it is to quit) might benefit naïve consumers. Sophisticated 
consumers might benefit from binding commitments to adhere to nicotine replacement or 
other therapies. 
Another closely related and open empirical question is the optimal design of an anti-
smoking commitment contract.
22
                                                 
22  For theories of optimal contracting with consumption commitments see, e.g., DellaVigna and 
Malmendier (2004), and Eliaz and Spiegler (2006). 
 To highlight just one aspect of product design, note that 
in our study CARES was largely bundled with deposit collection services. Hence we 
cannot yet unpack how much of the treatment effect was due to the financial 
commitment, and how much was due to frequent contact with the deposit collector. 
Important sub-questions on the role of deposit collection include whether and how much 
in-person contact with contract administrators is necessary for the commitment to be 
effective; e.g., it may be the case that deposit collection is important simply for 
convenience, and that direct deposit or mobile banking will be efficient substitutes in 
some settings. Alternately, contact with the deposit collector may be an integral part of 
the commitment per se (e.g., by permitting a commitment to not embarrass oneself by 
smelling of smoke), and/or a mechanism for making the commitment to quit salient.  17 
 
Research on what drives takeup decisions offers the potential for addressing many of 
the above questions in an integrated framework. If behavioral biases such as loss aversion  
partial naiveté, projection bias, and/or over-optimism play a role then there may be 
implications for product design (e.g., strong defaults) and marketing (e.g., framing, 
information on failure rates). Moreover this would suggest that consumer “type” is 
malleable, and hence that our large treatment-on-the-treated effects could apply broadly. 
Strong interplay between theory and empirics will be needed to continue developing 





Ariely, Dan and Klaus Wertenbroch (2002). "Procrastination, Deadlines, and 
Performance: Self-Control by Pre-Commitment." Psychological Science 13(3): 
219-224.  
Ashraf, Nava, Dean Karlan and Wesley Yin (2006). "Tying Odysseus to the Mast: 
Evidence from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 121(2): 635-672. May. 
Bansal, Maansi, Michael Cummings, Andrew Hyland and Gary Giovino (2004). "Stop-
smoking medications: Who uses them, who misuses them, and who is 
misinformed about them?" Nicotine & Tobacco Research 6(Supplement 3): S303-
S310. December. 
Becker, Gary, Michael Grossman and Kevin M. Murphy (1991). "Rational addiction and 
the effect of price on consumption." American Economic Review 81(2): 237-241. 
May. 
Becker, Gary and Kevin M. Murphy (1988). "A Theory of Rational Addiction." Journal 
of Political Economy 96(4): 675-700. August. 
Benowitz, NL, P Jacob, K Ahijevch, MJ Jarvis and S Hall (2002). "Biochemical 
Verification of Tobacco Use and Cessation. SRNT Subcommittee on Biochemical 
Verification, 2001." Nicotine & Tobacco Research 4(2): 149-59.  
Bernheim, B. Douglas and Antonio Rangel (2004). "Addiction and Cue-Triggered 
Decision Processes." American Economic Review 94(5): 1558-1590. October. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2002). "Annual Smoking-Attributable 
Mortality, Years of Potential Life Lost, and Economic Costs-- United States, 
1995-1999." MMWR Morbidity Mortality Weekly Report 51(14): 300-3.  
Charness, Gary and Uri Gneezy (forthcoming). "Incentives to Exercise." Econometrica  
Cokkinides, Vilma, Elizabeth Ward, Abmedin Jemal and Michael Thun (2005). "Under-
Use of Smoking Cessation Treatments: Results from the National Health 
Interview Survey, 2000." American Journal of Preventive Medicine 28(1): 119-
122.  
DellaVigna, Stefano (forthcoming). "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the 
Field." Journal of Economic Literature  
DellaVigna, Stefano and Ulrike Malmendier (2004). "Contract Design and Self-Control: 
Theory and Evidence." Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(2): 353-402. May. 
DiClemente, CC, JO Prochaska, SK Fairhurst, WF Velicer, MM Velasquez and JS Rossi 
(1991). "The process of smoking cessation: an analysis of precontemplation, 
contemplation, and preparation stages of change." Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology 59(2): 295-304.  
Eliaz, Kfir and Ran Spiegler (2006). "Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents." Review 
of Economic Studies 73(3): 689-714.  
Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine (2006). "A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control." 
American Economic Review 96(5): 1449-1476.  
Gruber, Jonathan and Botond Koszegi (2001). "Is Addiction "Rational"? Theory and 
Evidence." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(4): 1261-1303. November. 
Gul, Faruk and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2001). "Temptation and Self-Control." 
Econometrica 69(6): 1403-35.  19 
 
Gul, Faruk and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2004). "Self-Control and the Theory of 
Consumption." Econometrica 72(1): 119-58.  
Gul, Faruk and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2007). "Harmful Addiction." Review of Economic 
Studies 74(1): 147-72. January. 
Hoek, Janet and Phillip Gendall (2005). "Pictorial Health Warnings: A Review of 
Research Evidence." Research Report Prepared for Ministry of Health. April.  
Hymowtiz, Norman, K. Michael Cummings, Andrew Hyland, William R. Lynn, Terry F. 
Pechacek and Tyler D. Hartwell (1997). "Predictors of smoking cessation in a 
cohort of adult smokers followed for five years." Tobacco Control 6(suppl 2): 
S57-S62.  
Laibson, David (1997). "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting." Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 112(2): 443-477. May. 
Laibson, David (2001). "A Cue-Theory of Consumption." Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 116(1): 81-119. February. 
O'Donoghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin (1999). "Doing It Now or Later." American 
Economic Review 89(1): 103-24.  
O'Donoghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin (2001). "Choice and Procrastination." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 116(1): 121-60.  
O'Donoghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin (2002). "Addiction and Present-Biased 
Preferences." Working Paper. July.  
Orleans, C. Tracy (2007). "Increasing the Demand for and use of Effective Smoking 
Cessation Treatments." American Journal of Preventive Medicine 33(6S): S340-
S348.  
Paxton, Roger (1979). "The Effects of a Deposit Contract as a Component in a 
Behavioural Programme for Stopping Smoking." Behaviour Research and 
Therapy 18 45-50. 
Paxton, Roger (1980). "Deposit Contracts with Smokers: Varying Frequency and 
Amount of Repayments." Behaviour Research and Therapy 19: 117-123.  
Paxton, Roger (1982). "Prolonging the Effects of Deposit Contracts with Smokers." 
Behaviour Research and Therapy 21(4): 425-433.  
Phelps, Edmund S. and Robert A. Pollak (1968). "On Second-Best National Savings and 
Game-Equilibrium Growth." Review of Economic Studies 35: 185-199.  
Song, Fujian, James Raftery, Paul Aveyard, Chris Hyde, Pelham Barton and Nerys 
Woolacott (2002). "Cost-Effectiveness of Pharmacological Interventions for 
Smoking Cessation: A Literature Review and a Decision Analytic Analysis." 
Medical Decision Making 22: s26-s37. Sept-Oct Suppl. 
Stead, LF, R Perera, C Bullen, D Mant and T Lancaster (2008). "Nicotine Replacement 
Therapy for Smoking Cessation." Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews(1)  
Strotz, R.H. (1955). "Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization." 
Review of Economic Studies 23(3): 165-80.  
Thaler, Richard and Shlomo Benartzi (2004). "Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral 
Economics to Increase Employee Saving." Journal of Political Economy 112(1, 
Part 2 Supplement): S164-87. February. 
Tipones, Rommel and Lenora Fernandez (2006). "Predictors of Smoking Cessation 1 
Year After Enrollment in a Smoking Cessation Program in a Tertiary Hospital." 
Philippine Journal of Internal Medicine 44: 7-12. January-February. 20 
 
Volpp, Kevin G., Leslie K. John, Andrea Troxel, Laurie Norton, Jennifer Fassbender and 
George Loewenstein (2008a). "Financial incentive-based approaches for weight 
loss: A randomized trial." Journal of the American Medical Association 300(22): 
2631-2637.  
Volpp, Kevin G., Andrea Gurmankin Levy, David A. Asch, Jesse A. Berlin, John J. 
Murphy, Angela Gomez, Harold Sox, Jingsan Zhu and Caryn Lerman (2006). "A 
Randomized Controlled Trial of Financial Incentives for Smoking Cessation." 
Cancer Epidemiology, Biomarkers & Prevention 15(1): 12-18. January. 
Volpp, Kevin G., George Loewenstein, Andrea Troxel, Jalpa Doshi, Maureen Price, 
Mitchell Laskin and Stephen E. Kimmel (2008b). "A test of financial incentives 
to improve warfarin adherence." Working paper.   
Volpp, Kevin G., Andrea B.  Troxel, Mark V.  Pauly, Andrea  Puig, Henry A.  Glick, 
David A.  Asch, Robert  Galvin, Fei  Wan, Jill  DeGuzman, Elizabeth  Corbett, 
Janet Weiner and Janet  Audrain-McGovern (2009). "A Randomized, Controlled 
Trial of Financial Incentives for Smoking Cessation." New England Journal of 











 All CARES Cues Control
t-test of (2) 
vs (4)
t-test of (3) 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: CARES takeup
total number of CARES accounts 85 83 2 0
accounts with deposit collection services 77 75 2 0
offers with deposit collection services 640 640 0 0
takeup rate with deposit collection services 0.117
accounts without deposit collection sevices 8 6 2 0
offers without deposit collection services 141 141 0 0
takeup rate without deposit collection services 0.043
Panel B: Outcome Measures, Full Sample, Six Months
Found by surveyor for follow-up measurement 0.634 0.642 0.629 0.629 0.596 0.982 0.723 0.547 0.002
(0.011) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.049) (0.019)
Agreed to take urine test, conditional on being found 0.952 0.932 0.963 0.968 0.015 0.737 0.700 0.958 0.000
(0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.060) (0.010)
Found and agreed to test urine test 0.604 0.598 0.604 0.608 0.709 0.942 0.506 0.524 0.752
(0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.020) (0.055) (0.019)
Passed urine test (omitted missing respondents) 0.153 0.181 0.153 0.124 0.023 0.316 0.690 0.128 0.000
(0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.016) (0.072) (0.018)
Passed urine test 0.093 0.108 0.093 0.075 0.033 0.355 0.349 0.067 0.000
      (assumes all respondents who did not take the test are smokers) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.053) (0.009)
Passed urine test  0.146 0.168 0.146 0.120 0.041 0.330 0.483 0.123 0.000
     (assumes all respondents who were found but refused the test are smokers) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.016) (0.065) (0.017)
Number of observations 2000 781 603 616 83 698
Panel C: Outcome Measures, Full Sample, One Year
Found by surveyor for follow-up measurement 0.596 0.615 0.578 0.590 0.339 0.670 0.723 0.547 0.001
(0.011) (0.017) (0.201) (0.020) (0.049) (0.019)
Agreed to take urine test, conditional on being found 0.949 0.948 0.941 0.958 0.489 0.280 0.984 0.939 0.157
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.012)
Found and agreed to test urine test 0.565 0.582 0.544 0.565 0.515 0.451 0.723 0.532 0.001
(0.011) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.049) (0.019)
Passed urine test (omitted missing respondents) 0.181 0.203 0.155 0.178 0.372 0.389 0.350 0.175 0.002
(0.011) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.062) (0.020)
Passed urine test 0.103 0.118 0.084 0.101 0.296 0.313 0.253 0.093 0.000
      (assumes all respondents who did not take the test are smokers) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.048) (0.011)
Passed urine test  0.172 0.192 0.145 0.171 0.414 0.337 0.344 0.165 0.001
     (assumes all respondents who were found but refused the test are smokers) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.061) (0.019)
# of CARES accounts 85 83 2 0
Number of CARES offers with deposit collection services 640 640 0 0 76 564
Number of observations 2000 781 603 616 83 698
Standard errors in parentheses. Summary statistics in columns (1)-(4) are weighted to account for the change in probability of assignment to treatment across the three waves of marketing.
Table 1a. Summary Statistics, Outcome Variables
Outcome Measures
CARES GroupAll CARES Cues Control
t-test of (2) 
vs (4)
t-test of (3) 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Female 0.058 0.061 0.599 0.053 0.525 0.606 0.072 0.069 0.905
(0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.029) (0.010)
Age 36.571 36.951 35.667 36.972 0.978 0.101 38.341 37.181 0.465
(0.310) (0.493) (0.547) (0.576) (1.367) (0.520)
Number of cigarettes per day in the past 7 days 14.531 14.184 15.051 14.461 0.611 0.344 14.122 14.067 0.962
(0.234) (0.350) (0.463) (0.416) (1.105) (0.369)
Estimated amount spent on cigarettes per week (pesos) 101.715 99.287 105.351 101.227 0.611 0.344 98.854 98.472 0.962
(1.637) (2.453) (3.239) (2.915) (7.732) (2.586)
Tried to stop smoking in the past 12 months 0.457 0.446 0.452 0.476 0.277 0.417 0.422 0.427 0.927
(0.011) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.055) (0.019)
Wants to stop smoking sometime in life 0.723 0.725 0.690 0.754 0.219 0.013 0.855 0.723 0.010
(0.010) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.039) (0.017)
Wants to stop smoking now 0.168 0.178 0.144 0.179 0.957 0.099 0.289 0.159 0.003
(0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.050) (0.014)
Wants to stop smoking in 1 year 0.426 0.431 0.393 0.452 0.420 0.037 0.494 0.426 0.234
(0.011) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.055) (0.019)
Wants to stop smoking after 1 year 0.106 0.095 0.126 0.100 0.721 0.159 0.036 0.113 0.030
(0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012)
Will actually quit smoking in 6 months 0.523 0.537 0.473 0.555 0.493 0.004 0.741 0.483 0.000
(0.011) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.049) (0.019)
Respondent smells like cigarettes 0.403 0.423 0.379 0.400 0.377 0.469 0.277 0.461 0.001
(0.011) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.049) (0.019)
There are situations that make him/her want to smoke 0.933 0.954 0.911 0.927 0.042 0.290 0.927 0.888 0.285
(0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.029) (0.012)
Tries to avoid areas that make him/her want to smoke 0.571 0.565 0.578 0.573 0.783 0.857 0.658 0.505 0.010
(0.011) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.054) (0.019)
So addicted that s/he needs help to stop smoking 0.524 0.530 0.510 0.532 0.943 0.443 0.582 0.504 0.700
(0.011) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.055) (0.019)
F-statistic [p-value] from regression of assigned group  0.410 0.540
on all of the above baseline variables. [0.969] [0.900]
Number of observations 2000 781 603 616 83 698
Table 1b. Summary Statistics, Baseline Variables
Baseline Measures
CARES Group




Age (/100) 0.894** 0.858**
(0.405) (0.398)
Age squared (/100) -.010** -0.010**
(0.005) (0.005)
Number of cigarettes per day in the past 7 days (/100) 0.153 0.103
(0.321) (0.252)
Number of cigarettes per day squared (/100) -0.002 -0.001
(0.007) (0.005)
Having tried to stop smoking in the past 12 months -0.034 -0.025
(0.025) (0.019)
Wanting to stop smoking sometime in life 0.085 0.062
(0.085) (0.039)
Wanting to stop smoking now 0.034 (0.019)
(0.038) (0.028)
Wanting to stop smoking in 1 year 0.076 0.080
(0.080) (0.127)
Wanting to stop smoking after 1 year -0.002 -0.003
(0.037) (0.050)
Will actually quit smoking in 6 months 0.116*** 0.114***
(0.036) (0.041)
Respondent smells like cigarettes -0.073** -0.056***
(0.024) (0.019)
There are situations that make him/her want to smoke 0.031 0.037
(0.039) (0.033)
Try to avoid areas that make him/her want to smoke 0.043 0.039*
(0.027) (0.022)
So addicted that s/he needs help to stop smoking 0.034 0.026
(0.027) (0.022)
probability (all variables above = 0) 0.000 0.000
Observations 781 775
(pseudo-)R-squared 0.101 0.142
Number of CARES accounts opened 83 83
Mean of dependent variable 0.106 0.107
Table 2. Multivariate Analysis of CARES Take-up
OLS, Probit
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are
clustered by the marketing group if the respondents were surveyed in group. All regressions control for 3 phases of randomization
and use marketer fixed effects.  Probit specification reports marginal effects.# of Accounts Min Average Max Std. Dev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Opening balance 85 50 57.18 410 40.49
Success (i.e., those who passed 6-month urine test) 29 50 71.03 410 67.95
Failures (i.e., those who failed 6-month urine test) 56 50 50.00 50 0.00
# of deposits made into CARES account 85 1 11.75 29 9.35
Success (i.e., those who passed 6-month urine test) 29 7 20.90 26 5.47
Failures (i.e., those who failed 6-month urine test) 56 1 7.02 29 7.17
Proportion of clients who missed 3 deposits & lost deposit collection service 85 0 0.64 1 0.48
Success (i.e., those who passed 6-month urine test) 29 0 0.14 1 0.35
Failures (i.e., those who failed 6-month urine test) 56 0 0.89 1 0.31
Balance at 6 months 85 50 551.12 3410 651.01
Success (i.e., those who passed 6-month urine test) 29 282.75 1079.58 3410 703.37
Failures (i.e., those who failed 6-month urine test) 56 50 277.45 2657.75 414.62
Notes: Minimum account opening deposit was 50 pesos.
Table 3. Usage of CARES Bank Account by 6-Month Urine Test Result
Summary Statistics, Philippine Pesos (P50 = US$1)Assumption:
Outcome Measurement Timing: Six Months One Year Six Months One Year Six Months One Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Intent-to-Treat Estimates, OLS
   CARES Treatment 0.033* 0.035** 0.058** 0.057** 0.041* 0.054**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027)
   Cue cards 0.015 0.009 0.022 0.019 0.021 0.019
(0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025)
   # of observations 2000 2000 1226 1161 1287 1218
   F-test p-value: CARES = Cues 0.302 0.142 0.162 0.184 0.408 0.194
   R-squared 0.048 0.057 0.068 0.083 0.056 0.081
   Mean of dependent variable 0.083 0.089 0.123 0.147 0.119 0.140
   Sampling weights no no yes yes yes yes
Panel B: Treatment on the Treated Estimates, IV
   CARES Treatment 0.296** 0.312** 0.646** 0.533** 0.522* 0.509**
(0.151) (0.159) (0.270) (0.266) (0.293) (0.253)
   Cue cards 0.014 0.008 0.022 0.017 0.021 0.017
(0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025)
   # of observations 2000 2000 1226 1161 1287 1218
   F-test p-value: CARES = Cues 0.051 0.053 0.016 0.045 0.077 0.044
   Mean of dependent variable 0.083 0.089 0.123 0.147 0.119 0.140
   Sampling weights no no yes yes yes yes
Table 4. Impact of CARES on Passing Cotinine Urine Test
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions control for the 3 waves of marketing and include
covariates (all independent variables from take-up regressions in Table 3). Panel B shows the results of IV regressions with assignment to treatment group as an instrument for
CARES take-up. Cue cards take-up is not instrumented by CUES group assignment, because only two respondents rejected the cue cards. Models estimated in columns (3)-(6)
are weighted to reflect the different likelihood of a subject taking a urine test between CARES clients and non-clients and across CARES, Cues, and control groups.  
Everyone That Was Found But 
Refused To Take The Test Still 
Smokes Drop If Did Not Take The Test
Everyone That Did Not Take The Test 
Continues Smoking
OLS, IVAssumptions:
Outcome Measurement Timing: Six Months One Year Six Months One Year Six Months One Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Intent-to-Treat Estimates, OLS
   CARES Treatment 0.037** 0.035* 0.068** 0.055* 0.051** 0.054**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027)
   Cue cards 0.015 0.008 0.022 0.018 0.021 0.018
(0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025)
   # of observations 1859 1859 1199 1103 1255 1155
   F-test p-value: CARES = Cues 0.22 0.14 0.086 0.197 0.23 0.19
   R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.075 0.077 0.06 0.08
   Mean of dependent variable 0.08 0.09 0.123 0.147 0.12 0.14
   Sampling weights no no yes yes yes yes
Panel B: Treatment on the Treated Estimates, IV
   CARES Treatment 0.316** 0.291* 0.654*** 0.468* 0.529** 0.457**
(0.148) (0.151) (0.240) (0.243) (0.248) (0.232)
   Cue cards 0.015 0.008 0.022 0.016 0.022 0.016
(0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025)
   # of observations 1859 1859 1199 1103 1255 1155
   F-test p-value: CARES = Cues 0.03 0.05 0.006 0.054 0.03 0.05
   Mean of dependent variable 0.08 0.09 0.123 0.147 0.12
   Sampling weights no no yes yes yes yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All regressions control for the 3 waves of marketing and include covariates (all 
independent variables from take-up regressions in Table 2).  Panel B shows the results of IV regressions with assignment to treatment group as an instrument for CARES take-up. Cue cards 
take-up is not instrumented by CUES group assignment, because only two respondents rejected the cue cards. Models estimated in columns (3)-(6) are weighted to reflect the different 
likelihood of a subject taking a urine test between CARES clients and non-clients and across CARES, Cues, and control groups. 
Appendix Table 1: Impact of CARES
Same as Table 4, Except omits the no-deposit-collection treatment group from the analysis
OLS, IV
Everyone That Did Not Take The Test 
Continues Smoking Drop If Did Not Take The Test
Everyone That Was Found But 
Refused To Take The Test Continues 
Smoking# of Accounts Min Average Max Std. Dev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Opening balance 61 50 60.00 410 11.04
Success (i.e., those who passed 12-month urine test) 21 50 74.29 410 78.97
Failures (i.e., those who failed 12-month urine test) 40 50 52.50 100 47.61
# of deposits made into CARES account 61 1 12.70 26 9.22
Success (i.e., those who passed 12-month urine test) 21 1 15.86 26 9.81
Failures (i.e., those who failed 12-month urine test) 40 1 11.05 25 8.56
Proportion of clients who missed 3 deposits & lost deposit collection service 61 0 0.57 1 0.50
Success (i.e., those who passed 12-month urine test) 21 0 0.43 1 0.51
Failures (i.e., those who failed 12-month urine test) 40 0 0.65 1 0.48
Balance at 6 months 61 50 585.58 3410 673.33
Success (i.e., those who passed 12-month urine test) 21 50 786.76 1886.6 617.58
Failures (i.e., those who failed 12-month urine test) 40 50 479.96 3410 684.60
Appendix Table 2. Usage of CARES Bank Account by 12-Month Urine Test Result
Summary Statistics, Philippine Pesos (P50 = US$1)
Minimum account opening deposit was 50 pesos. For this table we drop the 24 clients who were not found for the surprise 12-month test, and code the 1 client who was found and refused
to take the test as a failure.Assumption:
Outcome Measurement Timing Six Months One Year Six Months One Year Six Months One Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Intent-to-Treat Estimates, Probit
   CARES Treatment 0.033** 0.033* 0.061** 0.059** 0.044* 0.055**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) (0.028)
   Cue cards 0.015 0.009 0.023 0.020 0.022 0.020
(0.016) (0.017) (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) (0.028)
   # of observations 1993 1989 1225 1155 1286 1212
   F-test p-value: CARES = Cues 0.232 0.140 0.140 0.178 0.355 0.192
   Mean of dependent variable 0.083 0.089 0.123 0.147 0.119 0.140
   Sampling weights no no yes yes yes yes
Panel B: Treatment on the Treated Estimates, IV Probit
   CARES Treatment 0.385 0.509 0.736*** 0.702*** 0.690* 0.689***
(0.367) (0.340) (0.286) (0.223) (0.380) (0.242)
   Cue cards 0.014 0.008 0.0238 0.018 0.023 0.018
(0.015) (0.017) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027)
   # of observations 1993 1989 1225 1155 1286 1212
   F-test p-value: CARES = Cues 0.153 0.053 0.074 0.025 0.134 0.028
   Mean of dependent variable 0.083 0.089 0.123 0.147 0.119 0.140
   Sampling weights no no yes yes yes yes
Appendix Table 3: Impact of CARES
Marginal effects with robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All probits control for the 3 waves of marketing and include 
covariates (all independent variables from take-up regressions in Table 2). Panel B shows the results of IV probits with assignment to treatment group as an instrument for CARES take-up.  Cue 
cards take-up is not instrumented by CUES group assignment, because only two respondents rejected the cue cards. Models estimated in columns (3)-(6) are weighted to reflect the different 
likelihood of a subject taking a urine test between CARES clients and non-clients and across CARES, Cues, and control groups. The sample size decreases here vs. OLS because indicator 
variables for a small number of missing baseline survey responses predict a perfect failure in test results.
Everyone That Was Found But 
Refused To Take The Test Still 
Smokes
Everyone That Did Not Take The Test 
Continues Smoking Drop If Did Not Take The Test
Probit, IV-Probit
Same as Table 4, except using a probit modelAssumption:
Outcome Measurement Timing: Six Months One Year Six Months One Year Six Months One Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Intent-to-Treat Estimates, OLS
   CARES Treatment 0.032* 0.034* 0.055** 0.053* 0.038 0.050*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027)
   Cue cards 0.017 0.006 0.026 0.015 0.026 0.015
(0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026)
   # of observations 2000 2000 1226 1161 1287 1218
   F-test p-value: CARES = Cues 0.367 0.103 0.272 0.191 0.612 0.200
   R-squared 0.007 0.004 0.010 0.006 0.003 0.006
   Mean of dependent variable 0.083 0.089 0.123 0.147 0.119 0.140
   Sampling weights no no yes yes yes yes
Panel B: Treatment on the Treated Estimates, IV
   CARES Treatment 0.286* 0.303* 0.620** 0.486* 0.469 0.458*
(0.148) (0.157) (0.272) (0.264) (0.286) (0.250)
   Cue cards 0.016 0.005 0.026 0.014 0.025 0.014
(0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025)
   # of observations 2000 2000 1226 1161 1287 1218
   F-test p-value: CARES = Cues 0.057 0.047 0.024 0.063 0.109 0.064
   Mean of dependent variable 0.083 0.089 0.123 0.147 0.119 0.140
   Sampling weights no no yes yes yes yes
Appendix Table 4. Impact of CARES
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions control for the 3 waves of marketing. Panel B shows the results of IV 
regressions with assignment to treatment group as an instrument for CARES take-up. Cue cards take-up is not instrumented by CUES group assignment, because only two respondents rejected 
the cue cards. Models estimated in columns (3)-(6) are weighted to reflect the different likelihood of a subject taking a urine test between CARES clients and non-clients and across CARES, 
Cues, and control groups. 
Everyone That Was Found But 
Refused To Take The Test Still 
Smokes
Everyone That Did Not Take The Test 
Continues Smoking Drop If Did Not Take The Test
OLS, IV
Same as Table 4, except dropping baseline covariatesAssumption:
Outcome Measurement Timing: Six Months One Year Six Months One Year Six Months One Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Intent-to-Treat Estimates, OLS
   CARES Treatment 0.045** 0.034 0.085*** 0.064* 0.062** 0.058*
(0.020) (0.021) (0.031) (0.035) (0.028) (0.033)
   Cue cards 0.032* -0.001 0.053* 0.006 0.049* 0.004
(0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.032) (0.027) (0.031)
   # of observations 1434 1434 853 824 898 865
   F-test p-value: CARES = Cues 0.517 0.094 0.332 0.102 0.679 0.111
   R-squared 0.063 0.066 0.095 0.100 0.075 0.097
   Mean of dependent variable 0.074 0.099 0.108 0.161 0.105 0.155
   Sampling weights no no yes yes yes yes
Panel B: Treatment on the Treated Estimates, IV
   CARES Treatment 0.343** 0.259 0.865*** 0.507* 0.716** 0.457*
(0.146) (0.162) (0.298) (0.279) (0.321) (0.265)
   Cue cards 0.032* -0.001 0.058** 0.006 0.053* 0.004
(0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.032) (0.028) (0.031)
   # of observations 1434 1434 853 824 898 865
   F-test p-value: CARES = Cues 0.026 0.090 0.005 0.061 0.032 0.074
   Mean of dependent variable 0.074 0.066 0.108 0.161 0.105 0.155
   Sampling weights no no yes yes yes yes
Appendix Table 5. Impact of CARES
Same as Table 4, Except on Sub-Sample Reporting in Baseline That Want to Stop Smoking at Some Point in Life
OLS, IV
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All regressions control for the 3 waves of marketing and include covariates (all 
independent variables from take-up regressions in Table 2).  Panel B shows the results of IV regressions with assignment to treatment group as an instrument for CARES take-up. Cue cards take-
up is not instrumented by CUES group assignment, because only two respondents rejected the cue cards. Models estimated in columns (3)-(6) are weighted to reflect the different likelihood of a 
subject taking a urine test between CARES clients and non-clients and across CARES, Cues, and control groups. 
Everyone That Did Not Take The Test 
Continues Smoking Drop If Did Not Take The Test
Everyone That Was Found But 
Refused To Take The Test Continues 
SmokingAll CARES Cues Control
t-test of (2) 
vs (4)
t-test of (3) 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Outcome Measures, Six Months
Found by surveyor for follow-up measurement 0.608 0.611 0.604 0.609 0.930 0.879 0.718 0.505 0.001
(0.013) (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.054) (0.022)
Agreed to take urine test 0.949 0.914 0.966 0.977 0.001 0.416 0.686 0.949 0.000
(0.007) (0.016) (0.011) (0.008) (0.066) (0.014)
Found and agreed to test urine test 0.577 0.558 0.583 0.595 0.248 0.727 (0.493) (0.479) 0.828
(0.013) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.060) (0.022)
Passed urine test (omitted missing respondents) 0.159 0.201 0.162 0.109 0.002 0.067 0.743 0.132 0.000
(0.013) (0.024) (0.022) (0.018) (0.075) (0.022)
Passed urine test 0.092 0.112 0.095 0.065 0.007 0.108 0.366 0.063 0.000
      (assumes all respondents who did not take the test are smokers) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.058) (0.011)
Passed urine test  0.151 0.184 0.156 0.106 0.006 0.075 0.510 0.125 0.000
     (assumes all respondents who were found but refused the test are smokers) (0.012) (0.023) (0.022) (0.017) (0.071) (0.021)
Number of observations 1434 576 412 446 71 505
Panel B: Outcome Measures, One Year
Found by surveyor for follow-up measurement 0.584 0.603 0.571 0.573 0.339 0.933 0.771 0.547 0.001
(0.013) (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.051) (0.022)
Agreed to take urine test 0.946 0.942 0.928 0.967 0.139 0.047 0.981 0.931 0.157
(0.008) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.019) (0.015)
Found and agreed to test urine test 0.553 0.568 0.530 0.555 0.668 0.466 (0.746) (0.509) 0.000
(0.013) (0.021) (0.012) (0.024) (0.052) (0.022)
Passed urine test (omitted missing respondents) 0.199 0.224 0.156 0.203 0.536 0.164 0.340 0.195 0.020
(0.014) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.066) (0.025)
Passed urine test 0.110 0.128 0.083 0.113 0.472 0.138 0.254 0.099 0.000
      (assumes all respondents who did not take the test are smokers) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.052) (0.013)
Passed urine test  0.188 0.212 0.145 0.197 0.649 0.112 0.333 0.181 0.011
     (assumes all respondents who were found but refused the test are smokers) (0.013) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.065) (0.023)
Number of observations 1434 576 412 446 71 505
Appendix Table 6. Summary Statistics, Outcome Variables
Outcome Measures, For Respondents who Reported in Baseline Wanting to Quit Smoking at Some Point in Their Life
CARES Group
Standard errors in parentheses. Summary statistics shows in columns (1)-(4) are weighted to account for the change in probability of assignment to treatment across the three waves of marketing.